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
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
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Review and Analysis of Recent Mobilizations and Deployments of US Army Reserve Components

by I. Heymont
E. W. McGregor



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FOREWORD

This report has been prepared as part of the study, "Alternatives for Improved Army Forces Capabilities," which was conducted by the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army Combat Developments Command and the Research Analysis Corporation.

The purpose of this report is to present a review and analysis of the historical experiences of the four most recent mobilizations and deployments of the US Army Reserve components in order to determine which experiences should be considered in any future mobilization. The US Army Reserve system is intended to provide, at an acceptable cost, units and individuals that can be made combat ready faster, on mobilization, than can newly organized units composed primarily of untrained personnel. The ultimate effectiveness of this system can be assessed only by an examination of its performance on mobilization. The assessment contained in this report is based on an analysis of the mobilizations for World War II, the Korean conflict, the Berlin crisis of 1961, and Vietnam in 1968.

Albert D. Tholen
Head, Resource Analysis Department

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Numerous individuals of Headquarters, Department of the Army, contributed to the development of this study. Particular acknowledgment is made of the assistance provided by the Office of the Chief of Military History, the Army National Guard Bureau, and the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve.

Several members of the staff of the Chief of Military History, including Mr. Billy C. Mossman, Dr. Walter G. Hermes, Mr. Karl E. Cocke, and Miss Hannah M. Zeidlik, were most helpful in providing guidance, source material, and other assistance. Mr. Elvin J. Willcock, Deputy Chief, Army Personnel Division, National Guard Bureau, gave unstintingly of his time to develop detailed personnel data pertaining to the Army National Guard in the Vietnam (1968) mobilization. Within the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, LTC Raymond O. Dove, Organization and Training Division, and Mr. Warren F. Schubert, Comptroller Division, were most helpful in providing detailed information on the Army Reserve mobilized in 1968.

The study was reviewed by the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army Combat Developments Command, the Office of the Chief of Military History, the National Guard Bureau, the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, and several members of the Technical Staff of RAC. Their comments were most valuable, but the responsibility for the contents of the study remains with the authors.

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(NOTE: The scope of Chapters 2-5, incl., is virtually identical and includes the following: Organization and Management in Peacetime--Premobilization Situation-Army Reserve--Premobilization Situation-Army National Guard--Mobilization Situation-Army Reserve--Mobilization Situation-Army National Guard--Postmobilization Situation-Army Reserve--Postmobilization Situation-Army National Guard--Conclusions--References.)

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Chapter 1

SUMMARY REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF RECENT MOBILIZATIONS AND
DEPLOYMENTS OF US ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS

GENERAL.

The mobilizations for World War II, the Korean conflict, the Berlin crisis of 1961, and Vietnam in 1968 had both unique and common features. The World War II mobilization was total and the other three were partial, each successively smaller in the number of Reserve component personnel and units involved. In each mobilization the relationship of the mobilization (M-Day) to the outbreak of hostilities (D-Day) was different. This relationship and data on the features that influenced the effectiveness of the US Army Reserve system in each mobilization are shown in Table 1-1. The remainder of this chapter discusses and analyzes the data in Table 1-1 and the changes in the US Army Reserve system that occurred between mobilizations. Certain deficiencies, such as failure to keep mobilization plans current, inaccuracy of personnel records of individual Reservists, and failure to screen Reservists for continued eligibility for active service, are not covered in this chapter but are discussed in the detailed account of each mobilization in subsequent chapters.

ROLES AND MISSIONS

There have been no changes in the basic roles and missions of the Army Reserve components as a result of the four mobilizations. The dual role of the National Guard as both a state and Federal force and the role of the Army Reserve as an exclusively Federal force have remained unchanged.

The basic missions of the National Guard have continued to be (a) to furnish, on mobilization, trained units to augment the Army and to provide a base for further expansion of Army forces, and (b) to furnish, in peacetime, forces under state control for domestic security and other

Table 1-1
SELECTED FEATURES OF RECENT MOBILIZATIONS

SCOPE	WORLD WAR II		KOREA		BERLIN, 1961		VIETNAM, 1968		
	M = D	15 mos. total mobilization major deployments	M = D	partial mobilization, major deployments	No hostilities, small partial mobilization, no major deployments	16-div force—840,000	Army Reserve	10 1/2-div force—1,500,000	Army Reserve
PREMOBILIZATION SITUATION									
Regular Army									
Reserve components:									
Basic force structure									
Personnel strength									
Recruitment for units									
Unit training (cont'd)									
Facilities									
Material									
MOBILIZATION SITUATION									
Number of units mobilized									
Personnel									
Number mobilized									
Percent of "OE" strength									
Percent of "OE" strength in induction									
Percent of "OE" strength mobilized in induction									
Unit training completed at induction									
Facilities									
Material									
POSTMOBILIZATION SITUATION ¹									
Personnel									
Full requirement									
Time to fill									
Training (cont'd)									
Equipment needs									
Completion, weeks									
Material									

¹Units include 12 training divisions in 1961 and 1968, and 3 separate inf bdes in 1968.

²Units include 18 separate inf bdes.

³Unit drills 3 hr weekly, when Vietnam buildup increased to 2 hr and MOUTAs

⁴Applied to divisions but is representative of all other units.

⁵Not available.

⁶Period from arrival at mobilization station to completion of training cycle.

⁷Army Reserve nondivisional units and in National Guard inf bdes.

state purposes. The basic mission of the Army Reserve has continued to be to furnish, on mobilization, both trained units and individuals to augment the Army and to provide a base for further expansion of Army forces. Included in this mission is the requirement to furnish, on mobilization, trained individuals to bring up to strength Active Army and mobilized Army Reserve and National Guard units.

In 1954 the National Guard assumed the additional task of manning static air defense installations in the US under operational control of the Active Army. This new task did not change the overall basic mission and role of the National Guard.

FORCE STRUCTURE

The force structure of the National Guard and Army Reserve has varied significantly in the period covered by the four mobilizations. Before World War II, both the National Guard and Army Reserve force structure provided for large numbers of units that could be manned and equipped only at very low levels in view of the personnel and procurement authorizations. National Guard units were manned at about 50 percent of TOE strength and Army Reserve units, for all practical purposes, existed only on paper. In fact, the Army Reserve was mobilized for World War II as individuals; not a single Army Reserve unit was mobilized as an organizational entity. After World War II, the concept of relying on the Reserve components for large numbers of units was continued. Contributing factors included reaffirmation of a military policy based on the maintenance of a relatively small standing army and the development of a large, well trained civilian Reserve, as well as the availability of large stocks of equipment remaining after the war.

The post-World War II Army Reserve force structure contained units and several manpower pools of trained individuals. The two major manpower pools were the Volunteer Reserve and the Inactive Reserve each with different inactive duty training obligations and liability for recall to active service. The National Guard divisions and units mobilized for the Korean conflict were, on the average, at less than 50 percent of TOE strength and far below the TOE authorizations of equipment. The stocks of World War II equipment had dwindled rapidly because of deterioration and use to meet the requirements of military assistance programs and were inadequate to support the force structure.

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Between the Korean conflict and the Berlin crisis of 1961 the Reserve component force structure was modified to bring into closer balance TOE requirements and the available personnel and equipment. The number of units was drastically reduced while authorized strengths were increased. Although the number of National Guard divisions remained unchanged, the number of company-sized units was reduced. As a result the National Guard and Army Reserve units mobilized for the Berlin crisis of 1961 reported with about 67 percent of their TOE personnel strength - the highest percentage achieved in any mobilization up to that time. Again, the mobilized units were below TOE levels in equipment because Army appropriations had been inadequate to support the force structure with all the authorized equipment.

In the reorganizations of the Reserve components during the years following the Berlin crisis, the balance between units and personnel was further improved by significant reductions in the number of divisions and company-sized units. As a result the Reserve component units mobilized in 1968 reported with about 86 percent of their TOE personnel strength - the highest percentage ever achieved. However, there was no significant change in regard to equipment, and all units mobilized were rated C-4 in equipment readiness.

PEACETIME RECRUITMENT

Before World War II and the Selective Service Act of 1940, the Regular Army and the Reserve components were volunteer forces. The size of these forces was constrained partly by budget and partly by the ability to recruit personnel. When the National Guard and Army Reserve were reconstituted as volunteer forces after World War II, the number of volunteers was inadequate. Consequently, the Selective Service Act of 1948 included a number of provisions to encourage enlistment in the National Guard and Army Reserve units. The Act provided that men 19 to 26 years old could be inducted for 21 months followed by 5 years in the Reserves without any further requirement for inactive duty training. This Reserve obligation could be reduced to 3 years by enlisting for that period in a National Guard or Army Reserve unit. Eighteen year olds, up to a maximum of 161,000, could enlist for 1 year of CONUS active duty and a Reserve obligation of 6 years during which they could be recalled

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annually for 1 month of training. They could also be assigned, without their concurrence, to a Reserve unit, and in such a case their obligation was reduced to 4 years. If such an assignment was refused, they could be recalled to active duty for 12 months. These procedures were rarely invoked. If unable to recruit sufficient prior-service personnel, the National Guard (but not the Army Reserve) was authorized to enlist men under 18½ years of age direct from civilian life. Such an enlistment required no active duty training and provided draft deferral until age 28 if inactive duty training was satisfactory. This source of manpower virtually sustained National Guard strength for several years. These measures, plus legislation in 1948 and 1949 providing pay for inactive duty training of the Army Reserve and other forms of compensation for both National Guard and Army Reserve personnel, permitted building up the Reserve components to the limits permitted by budgetary constraints.

A major result of the Selective Service Act of 1948 was that the National Guard was able to overcome recruiting difficulties through enlisting volunteers who exercised their legal option to avoid the draft and all active duty by joining a National Guard unit - if they could find a vacancy. The result was that the National Guard divisions mobilized in 1950 for the Korean conflict reported with only 27 to 46 percent of their personnel MOS qualified and with most of the youngest Guardsmen having no active duty experience except for the annual 2 weeks of active duty training.

By legislative acts in 1951, 1952, and 1955, Congress sought to remedy the weaknesses in providing trained Reservists for the National Guard and Army Reserve, as revealed in the Korean mobilization. Public Law 51 of 1951 required a minimum of 4 months of active service before an individual in the Army could be sent overseas. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 provided the statutory structure of the Reserve components as they exist today. It established Ready, Standby, and Retired categories as descending levels of liability for recall to active duty and required that the recall of veterans and nonveterans would ensure as far as practicable a fair "sharing of hazardous exposure."

The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 specified a total military obligation of 6 years except for those who enlisted or were drafted and served on active duty for at least 2 years. Individuals in the latter category

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were obligated to participate for a total of 5 years of active service and Reserve training. The sixth year could be spent in the Standby Reserve with no training obligation. In practice, most Reservists in this category were not forced to carry out their legal obligation for annual training while in the Ready Reserve Reinforcement Manpower Pool. The 1955 Act also provided that men below age $18\frac{1}{2}$ could enlist directly from civilian life in Army Reserve units that had vacancies. They would receive individual training during an initial active duty period of 3 to 6 months, followed by inactive duty training in an Army Reserve unit for a total military obligation of 8 years. National Guard enlistees below age $18\frac{1}{2}$ could volunteer for the initial active duty training or, as authorized in existing selective service legislation, could opt for no initial period of active duty training but remain in a Ready Reserve status until age 28. In 1957 the Army required enlistees in the National Guard to undergo initial active duty training in the same manner as for the Army Reserve. As a result of these policies, in the mobilization for the Berlin crisis of 1961 about 67 percent of those mobilized in units were MOS qualified. However, the active duty experience of the members of the mobilized units was low - about 75 percent or more had only 6 or fewer months of initial training.

The deficiencies in individual training uncovered in the 1961 mobilization were a strong factor in the passage of Public Law 88-110 in September 1963. This Act established a new Reserve Enlistment Program (REP 63) that provided a uniform 6-year obligation for men from ages 17 to 26 enlisting from civilian life in either a National Guard or Army Reserve unit. It required an initial period of active duty for training of at least 4 months and enough longer to permit qualification at the entry level in the MOS for which the man was enlisted. This program ensured that all men enlisted from civilian life would have the required training to permit deployment overseas on mobilization. The variable-length initial active duty training resulted in improved MOS training. The impact of the REP 63 program was demonstrated in the mobilization for Vietnam in 1968 when about 85 percent of the members of mobilized units were MOS qualified. However, the active duty experience of the members of these units still remained low with about 85 percent or more having only 6 or fewer months.

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PEACETIME TRAINING

Before World War II the inactive duty training of National Guard units consisted of 48 paid drills (2 hours each) and 2 weeks of active duty training annually. Army Reserve units, consisting mostly of officers, were authorized annually only 2 weeks of active duty for training because of severe budgetary constraints. After World War II, Army Reserve units, which were reconstituted with significant numbers of both officers and enlisted men, were authorized paid drills on the same basis as the National Guard. The inadequacies of 48 drills annually of 2 hours each were recognized; in 1965 drill periods were extended to 4 hours. Since 1965 most drill periods have been multiple, either 8 hours in one day or 16 hours on a weekend.

In 1965 a 150,000-man Selected Reserve Force (SRF I) consisting of selected National Guard and Army Reserve units was created to fill the gaps in the Strategic Army Forces (STRAF) that resulted from the deployment of Active Army units to Vietnam. SRF I units were authorized full TOE strength, priority among Reserve component units for equipment, and 72 paid drills annually, in addition to the annual active duty for training. The Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act of 1967 established the Selected Reserve Force (SRF II) on a statutory basis. As a result of experience with SRF I, paid drills were reduced to 58 annually. It was found that 72 drills annually could not be maintained in peacetime for any considerable period because of conflicts with the civilian pursuits of the Reservists. The SRF units as a whole were considered to have achieved company-level training and, in a few instances, battalion-level. However, virtually all the SRF units mobilized in 1968 had to undergo a complete unit training program to achieve deployability readiness. This was no different from the experience of earlier mobilizations. The training readiness achieved by the SRF units was either overstated, outdated in the readiness reporting system, or lost for several reasons, to include the reorganization of Reserve component units that occurred just before the mobilization, requirements for transition training related to new equipment, and personnel turbulence on mobilization.

The home station facilities provided in peacetime for Reserve component training improved over the period covered by the four mobilizations. Overall, facilities for small-unit training and maintenance have never been

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more than marginal. Facilities for inactive duty training beyond the company level have, with a few minor exceptions, been inadequate. Inadequate funding and the difficulty of securing suitable sites in urban areas have been the major reasons for the inadequacy of facilities.

The equipment provided to the Reserve components in peacetime in the period covered by the four mobilizations has been at best barely adequate to support peacetime training. The equipment provided has been inadequate in numbers and frequently obsolescent with the result that retraining on new items was required in every mobilization. Additionally, every time the Active Army mobilized after World War II, equipment was taken from the Reserve components to meet Active Army requirements.

MOBILIZATION SITUATION

Units

In each mobilization after World War II, there was successively less reliance on Reserve component units mobilized and deployed. This was due, in part, to increases in the deployed strength of the Active Army. Of the eight National Guard divisions mobilized in the Korean war only two were deployed to a combat theater. Two more divisions, long after they had lost their National Guard character because of successive personnel levies, were deployed to Europe for further unit training. The two National Guard divisions mobilized for Berlin in 1961 did not leave the CONUS. In the 1968 mobilization the largest units were two brigades, and they were not deployed overseas.

Personnel

When measured as a percentage of TOE, each mobilization was increasingly successful in providing gross numbers with basic training of the individuals; however, each mobilization was marked by severe personnel turbulence in Reserve component units with consequent delays in the start and completion of unit training. This turbulence resulted from a number of factors including (1) unit reorganizations immediately before or after mobilization, (2) failure to eliminate those individuals who would not serve in wartime for various reasons, (3) personnel levies on the mobilized units, (4) shortages of specialists with skill levels beyond the entry level, (5) shortages of branch qualified officers, and (6) lack of experienced personnel capable of conducting a unit training program on mobilization. Shortages of specialists with skill levels beyond the entry level are

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the result of some combination of limitations imposed by area recruitment policies, lack of modern equipment, and the inability in many cases to advance beyond the MOS entry level in the time allotted for inactive duty training. The last factor, inexperienced personnel, was particularly noted in the mobilizations for World War II and Vietnam. In the mobilization for Vietnam virtually every Reserve component unit was assisted by a host unit of the Active Army in planning and conducting unit training. In the case of the 69th Inf Bde, for example, it was found desirable to assign responsibility for training supervision to the 5th Inf Div (Mech). This was accomplished, in part, by matching commander for commander, down to the platoon leader level, and staff member for staff member. This situation is a result of recent reorganizations, the lack of active duty experience of Reserve component personnel, and the demands of their civilian pursuits. In every mobilization, personnel turbulence contributed to delays in completing unit training programs because of the time required to receive and train qualified fillers, who in many cases were late in arrival.

Training

A consistent feature of each mobilization was the need, with very few minor exceptions, for Reserve component units to go through a complete unit training cycle on mobilization to achieve training readiness. In the World War II and Korean mobilizations, it was necessary to start with the entire or compressed basic individual training cycle. In many cases, owing to personnel turbulence, equipment shortages, and inexperienced personnel, it took longer to complete the unit training program than the time prescribed by mobilization production time schedules, even when the unit was not levied to furnish individual replacements or cadres.

Facilities and Equipment

Except for the total mobilization of World War II, the facilities on mobilization were generally adequate. Some initial difficulties were encountered during the large partial mobilization for the Korean conflict. No significant difficulties were encountered during the smaller mobilizations of 1961 and 1968. Overall, facilities posed no significant problems in the conduct of unit training during the three partial mobilizations.

A consistent feature of all four mobilizations has been the unavailability, on mobilization, of adequate TOE equipment for the mobilized units. Although equipment shortages were eventually remedied, they

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seriously affected training progress and deployment readiness, particularly in the World War II and Korean conflict mobilizations. The least adverse effect was in the 1968 Vietnam mobilization, which involved the smallest numbers of units and personnel of all four mobilizations.

CONCLUSIONS

Considering the basic purpose of the Reserve system in regard to furnishing units rapidly, it can be concluded that the US Army Reserve system was totally inadequate in the World War II mobilization and succeeded only marginally in the partial mobilizations that followed. The reasons for the inability of the Reserve system to achieve greater success are many and include the following:

- (1) The national policy on recruitment for the National Guard and Army Reserve units.
- (2) Deficiencies in national manpower policies that could not be overcome with the available support.
- (3) Failure to provide adequate equipment for Reserve units.
- (4) Failure to provide Reserve units with adequate inactive duty training sites and facilities.
- (5) Improper organization of Reserve component units.

The lack of adequate numbers of volunteers for the National Guard after World War II set off a chain of laws that resulted in the National Guard and Army Reserve units being manned overwhelmingly with personnel with active duty experience of 6 months or less. The US practice of providing an option of enlisting from civilian life in a Reserve component unit, if a vacancy can be found, and thus avoiding 2 years of active service is unique. The perceived inequities of the call-up during the Korean War resulted in a Congressional policy that requires that in the event of mobilization there should be a fair "sharing of hazardous exposure." The US Army Reserve system now produces units composed of individuals with the least experience at a time when presumably the need is greatest for the most experienced personnel so that training time after mobilization can be minimized.

The impact of inexperienced leaders and lack of critical specialists on the speed of achieving combat readiness on mobilization has improved only marginally over the four mobilizations. This impact might have

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been less if the Reserve component units had been adequately supported by experienced Active Army personnel integrated into the Reserve component units. The US Army is virtually unique among military forces in not integrating some number of experienced active duty personnel into its Reserve component units. The Federally paid civilian technicians, although helpful, have not been provided in adequate numbers.

Up until the present time, the perceived need to make National Guard and Army Reserve units combat ready rapidly has apparently never been strong enough to warrant appropriation of adequate funds to ensure that sufficient equipment is on hand to equip Reserve component units properly for peacetime training and to bring them to wartime authorizations without delay on mobilization. Similarly, sufficient funds for provision of truly adequate peacetime training sites and facilities have never been provided.

The last major factor militating against the rapid availability of combat-ready Reserve component units is organizing these units at too high a level. Large formations such as divisions and brigades require more training time and experienced leadership than smaller formations such as battalions. More Reserve component battalions can be combat ready sooner if they are not held up because of the time required to train higher Reserve component formations.

In summary, listed below are the persistent major defects in the four mobilizations examined that should be considered in planning for improvements in deployability readiness.

1. Deficiencies in peacetime in the level of experience within or available to National Guard and Army Reserve units.
2. Inadequacies in equipment for peacetime training and for issue of full wartime requirements without delay on mobilization of Reserve component units required for early deployment.
3. Inadequacies in peacetime training sites and facilities for the Reserve components.
4. The organization of Reserve component units required for early deployment into high-level formations that require extensive training that cannot be effectively accomplished in peacetime.

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Chapter 2

WORLD WAR II MOBILIZATION OF RESERVE COMPONENTS

ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN PEACETIME

Regular Army*

Between 1936 and 1939 the Regular Army strength rose from about 166,000 to 187,000. This small force, including the Air Corps, was scattered among posts in the US, Hawaii, the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, Alaska, and the Philippines. Theoretically it had nine "square" infantry divisions (four regiments) and one cavalry division in the United States, one division in Hawaii, and one in the Philippines. Actually only three divisions were formally organized (each had less than the TOE strength of about 22,000), and the troops were scattered among many posts and occupied with administrative, housekeeping, training, and school duties. Supporting units to round out divisions, corps, and field army forces existed mostly in mobilization plans. The Regular Army was poorly equipped, mainly with obsolescent World War I equipment. Annual military expenditures for the Army, including the Air Corps and the Reserve components, varied from about \$377 million in FY36 to \$436 million in FY39.²

As a result of the outbreak of the war in Europe in September 1939, the Army expanded. From the latter part of 1939 to early 1940, there was a modest growth through volunteer enlistments in the Regular Army and an increase in the size and pace of training in the National Guard. The period from the fall of France in June 1940 to 7 December 1941 was marked by the passage of the Selective Service Act, the mobilization of the National Guard, and the call to active duty of individual Army Reservists in large

*The material in this section is derived mainly from Ref 1.

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numbers. Total mobilization started on 7 December 1941. By that date the Active Army had grown to 36 divisions, including 18 National Guard Divisions, in varying states of training. Enough supporting units had also been formed to round out the force structure partly.

The expansion before 7 December 1941 was accompanied by a change in the division structure to the "triangular" division based on three regiments, with all Regular Army divisions organized on that basis by that date.

Reserve Components

Roles and Missions. The Reserve consisted of two components: the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps (referred to hereafter as the Army Reserve), which included the Officers Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps. The Army Reserve was completely controlled by the US Army. Both components of the Reserve were designed to provide trained units to augment the Regular Army on mobilization and to provide a base for further expansion. In addition, the National Guard was to provide forces under State control for emergencies.

Policies and Programs. Both components of the Reserve were volunteer forces. Most of the support for the National Guard was provided by the Federal Government.

Force Structure. The force structure for the Army Reserve provided for 27 divisions. The National Guard provided for 18 divisions, most of the basic units for four additional cavalry divisions, and a number of non-divisional units intended to support mobilization.

Mobilization Plans

Mobilization Plans before 1939 were heavily influenced by low defense appropriations. The plans envisaged the creation of an initial protective force to provide an emergency defense capability and the base for initial expansion to a total strength of 1 million including the Reserve components. However, even as late as FY39 funds were inadequate to maintain the necessary Active and Reserve forces, stocks of equipment, and facilities to support such a plan. As a result, the mobilization plans up to 1939 could not be executed.³

At the beginning of the Army expansion, there were no specific training programs for units to reach readiness for deployment. In February 1942 the Army Ground Forces published a training program to prepare a division for deployment in 44 weeks, not including 4 weeks for activation.

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The 44-week program included 13 weeks of unit training through the regimental level and 14 weeks of combined arms training including division maneuvers. The schedule for nondivisional units covered 26 weeks of training.⁴

The training program for divisions was reduced in November 1942 to 35 weeks as follows: individual training, 13 weeks; unit training, 11 weeks; and combined arms training (to include division maneuvers), 11 weeks. This program was unchanged throughout the war, but adherence to it was modified as demanded by circumstances.⁵

PREMOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY RESERVE

Force Structure

On 30 June 1939 the 27 divisions of the Army Reserve existed only on paper. In fact, the Army Reserve consisted primarily of officers, principally graduates from the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) program.

Personnel

On 30 June 1939 the strength of the Army Reserve was 119,733. Of this number all were officers except for about 3000 enlisted men. There are no data to indicate that any measures were taken to increase this strength between 30 June 1939 and 7 December 1941. About 90 percent of all Reserve officers were company grade, and about 17 percent of all Reserve officers were not participating in any kind of training. The enlisted men were mostly former members of the Regular Army, but they were widely dispersed and of little military significance.

Training consisted primarily of correspondence courses and annual 15-day periods of active duty. Reserve officers were divided into two groups according to eligibility for annual active duty training of 2 or more weeks. To remain eligible for such training, the Reserve officer was required both to complete 200 hours of correspondence courses and take 15-day summer training tours at least twice in 5 years. In 1936, a typical year, 22,175 Reserve officers (19 percent of all Reserve officers) served on tours of active duty for training. Of this number, 543 had longer tours, primarily to attend resident courses at Army schools.⁶ The 15-day active duty training tours were spent conducting Citizens Military Training Corps Camps, or attending a special course of instruction, or being attached to a Regular Army unit.

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Inactive duty unit training was voluntary, without pay, and consisted of classroom instruction because the Army Reserve had virtually no equipment or armory-type facilities.

About 86 percent of all Reserve officers in 1936 had no prior active military service other than for training.⁷ This percentage was probably higher in 1940 because of the continued loss of Reserve officers with World War I experience.

PREMOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Force Structure

In late 1939 and through most of 1940 there were major reorganizations of National Guard nondivisional units. Many separate infantry units (regiments and brigades) and horse cavalry units were reorganized into anti-aircraft, field artillery, and mechanized cavalry units. The tank companies were withdrawn from a number of the infantry divisions and reorganized as separate tank battalions. The force structure did not include all the supporting service units required by the divisions for combat. The infantry divisions were square divisions with a TOE strength of about 22,000.

Personnel

Between 30 June 1939 and 30 June 1940 the strength of the National Guard grew from 199,491 to 241,612. Further increases were authorized later. A total of 297,754 National Guardsmen (19,795 officers, 221 warrant officers, and 277,738 enlisted men) were eventually mobilized. When mobilized, the National Guard divisions varied from about 41 to 56 percent of their TOE strength (see Table 2-1).

Training

Premobilization annual training consisted of 48 paid drills (2 hours each) and one 15-day encampment. In 1939 and 1940 drills were increased to 60 and the annual encampment to 3 weeks. Training was conducted under State control in accordance with standards set by the War Department. Basic training of the individual was conducted within the National Guard units.

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Table 2-1
MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF NATIONAL
GUARD DIVISIONS, WORLD WAR II^a

Division ^b	Date mobilized	Mobilized strength	Date deployed ^c	Months from mobilization to deployment
30th	16 Sep 40	9,918	Jan 44	40
41st	16 Sep 40	12,372	Mar 42	18
44th	16 Sep 40	10,822	Aug 44	47
45th	16 Sep 40	9,499	May 43	32
27th	15 Oct 40	11,389	Mar 42	17
37th	15 Oct 40	9,682	May 42	19
32d	15 Oct 40	11,602	Apr 42	18
31st	25 Nov 40	12,484	Feb 44	38
36th	25 Nov 40	12,362	Apr 43	28
35th	23 Dec 40	12,059	May 44	40
26th	16 Jan 41	9,081	Aug 44	43
38th	17 Jan 41	9,054	Dec 43	36
29th	3 Feb 41	9,865	Sep 42	19
34th	10 Feb 41	12,279	Jan 42	11
28th	17 Feb 41	11,318	Sep 43	30
43d	24 Feb 41	12,092	Sep 42	18
40th	3 Mar 41	10,873	Aug 42	16
33d	5 Mar 41	11,716	Jun 43	27

^aDerived from Refs 8 and 9.

^bSome divisions were mobilized without some minor elements; TOE strength about 22,000.

^cMovement to port of embarkation.

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MOBILIZATION SITUATION- ARMY RESERVE

General

The Army Reserve was mobilized exclusively by the call-up of individuals. Not a single Army Reserve unit was mobilized. However, the designations of the divisions were used in the general mobilization.

Personnel

By 1 July 1941, 56,000 reserve officers had been called to active duty, and by 7 December 1941 this number had risen to about 80,000. In effect, the Army Reserve was used as a pool of individuals, mostly officers.

Training

The training level of the officers of the Army Reserve called to active duty was found to be low. LTG Lesley J. McNair, then Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, commented in February 1942 that officers from the Reserve components, instead of being immediately ready to assist in the task of converting a mass of civilians into soldiers, had themselves required further training.¹⁰

The company grade Army Reserve officers, called to active duty, were evaluated by the Chief of Staff, GEN George Marshall, in a letter written 30 July 1941, to be superior to their National Guard counterparts because they had attained a "uniform standard of technical preparation and of general education."¹¹

MOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

General

The National Guard was completely mobilized in increments starting on 16 September 1940 and ending about 9 months later. About one-half the National Guard was mobilized in the first 3 months and all divisions in the first 7 months. The rate of mobilization was conditioned by the availability of housing and training facilities. In many cases the National Guard divisions "swamped the training centers (mobilization stations), where firing ranges, maneuver areas, and other facilities were inadequate for the increased demands."¹²

No information is available on the status of detailed prewar mobilization plans, if any, for each National Guard division. The available information indicates that such plans either did not exist or were not applicable to the situation existing in 1940 and 1941.

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Personnel

The strength of the National Guard on 30 June 1941, after the last elements were mobilized, was 263,406--about 32 percent greater than the 30 June 1939 strength of 199,491.

Training

Many of the National Guardsmen were recent recruits. The unit training status on mobilization was poor for a number of reasons including lack of equipment, inadequate training time, and inefficiency of the officers. Of the 19,795 National Guard officers mobilized, only 6,800 had completed a course of instruction in a service school.¹³ Observers from the National Guard Bureau at the August 1940 maneuvers, reporting on the participating National Guard divisions, stated "that 20 percent of the staff and divisional officers were not qualified, that the troops needed squad and platoon problems rather than division and corps problems, and that all troops required at least three months' basic training."¹⁴

Materiel

On mobilization, the National Guard units were equipped with obsolescent World War I equipment and, in some cases, had little or no major mission - type items of equipment.

Facilities

The mobilization stations were, for the most part, in the process of construction and inadequate for the prompt start of training. In many cases the existing housing and training facilities were inadequate.¹⁵

POSTMOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY RESERVE

Army Reserve personnel, mostly officers, were assigned to fill vacancies in newly activated divisions and Regular Army and National Guard units. By 1 July 1941, Army Reserve officers constituted about 75 to 90 percent of the Regular Army divisions.¹⁶ The percentage of Army Reserve officers in relation to the total number of officers fell sharply as the Officer Candidate School (OCS) Program began to produce officers.

POSTMOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Personnel

Between 23 July 1940 and 30 June 1941 the National Guard discharged, for various reasons, 96,043 men, which is equal to about 40 percent of the 30 June 1940 strength of 241,612.¹⁷ Vacancies were filled by local

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recruiting to bring the National Guard up to the 30 June 1941 strength of 263,406. On mobilization, personnel shortages were filled with inductees direct from reception centers. The Army replacement training centers did not produce fillers with basic training until April 1941, long after the bulk of the National Guard units had been mobilized.

In June 1941, 3 months after the mobilization of the last National Guard division, 22 percent of the first lieutenants (771) were over 40 years old, 919 captains were over 45, 100 lieutenant colonels were over 55,¹⁸ and there was a dearth of competent regimental and battalion commanders.¹⁹ According to LTG Lesley J. McNair, "It was found necessary to make almost 100 percent replacement of the commissioned officers with troops from the grade of major general down through the grade of colonel and to replace an extremely high percentage of officers of lower rank..²⁰

Training

The ability of National Guard units to start training after mobilization was limited because of inadequacies of personnel to conduct the training, lack of facilities and equipment, and initial personnel turbulence. As a result National Guard divisions conducted training for 2 months before receiving inductees. "Such a procedure," according to an official US Army history, "was necessary in view of the extreme inadequacy of provisions made for the field training of the larger units of the National Guard in time of peace."²¹

After receipt of the first increment of inductees as fillers, the National Guard units generally followed the same training patterns as other comparable Army units with two major exceptions. National Guard divisions underwent a major reorganization from square to triangular divisions during January - February 1942. This reorganization required retraining of units and individuals. Although National Guard divisions were not required to furnish cadres for new divisions, they were levied heavily for individuals for replacements and to organize nondivisional units. For example, the 30th Infantry Division declined from a strength of 12,400 in June 1942 to 3000 in August 1942 because of levies. These levies forced repetition of training cycles after receipt of replacements. The time from mobilization to movement to port for oversea deployment of National Guard divisions varied from 11 months (34th Infantry division, mobilized February 1941) to 47 months (44th Infantry Division, mobilized September 1940), with an average of 27.9 months for all National Guard

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divisions. Four National Guard nondivisional units were deployed overseas before 7 December 1941. Of these, the three units deployed to the Philippines (2 tank battalions and 1 antiaircraft artillery regiment) had been mobilized at least 8 months before deployment. The fourth unit, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, was mobilized in September 1940 and moved to Hawaii in November 1940 on a peacetime change of station.

Materiel

The equipment immediately available to the National Guard mobilization was inadequate both quantitatively and qualitatively for training. Industrial mobilization lagged behind personnel mobilization, and the shortage of modern equipment for training was particularly acute until 1943. In 1941 and 1942 many units had to use simulated equipment. Starting in 1942, units received progressively larger percentages of their essential equipment as they progressed through various stages of training. However, units were often required to give up equipment to meet the needs of higher priority units.

Facilities

The facilities at mobilization sites were initially inadequate and hampered the start of training. However, the facilities problem for National Guard units eased considerably after March 1941.²²

CONCLUSIONS

The initiation of World War II mobilization preceded the outbreak of hostilities by about 15 months. However, the Army Reserve and National Guard divisions that existed before the World War II mobilization did not contribute directly to the availability of combat-ready divisions faster than the organization of new divisions based on Active Army cadres, inductees, and individual Reservists. This conclusion must be weighted in the light of the specific circumstances that existed during the World War II mobilization. The training time required to achieve combat readiness was not the controlling factor. The controlling factors were the availability of shipping, the industrial mobilization rate, and the deployment strategy. More than half the combat divisions remained in the US until the invasion of Europe in 1944 permitted deployment to that area. Of the 87 divisions moved overseas, 57 moved in 1944 and 1945. The date of mobilization of a National Guard division had no relation to the elapsed time before its deployment.

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The availability of a pool of Reserve officers, primarily college graduates, was of significant assistance in the initial expansion of the Active Army until officer candidate schools were established. However, the officers of the Army Reserve did require training when called to active duty. The National Guard provided the framework for the production of units.

World War II mobilization provides insights on deficiencies that contributed to delays in achieving combat readiness after mobilization. The major deficiencies are described below.

Force Structure

(a) Major Reserve combat units were maintained in the force structure in peacetime even though they could not be manned or equipped at full or near-full TOE strength within the authorized levels of manpower and funds.

(b) The force structure for Reserve units did not provide an adequate balance among divisions and nondivisional units.

(c) Reserve units remained organized under obsolete TOEs for significant periods before and after mobilization.

Personnel

(a) Reserve units were manned in peacetime at levels significantly below TOE strengths.

(b) Adequate provisions were not made in peacetime to ensure that personnel in Reserve units were qualified for active duty.

(c) The standards for Federal recognition of National Guard officers were either inadequate or ineffectively applied.

(d) The loss of personnel by Reserve units after mobilization, because of levies for various purposes, severely delayed achieving combat readiness.

Training

(a) Peacetime training of 48 two-hour drills and 2 weeks of active duty for training were inadequate to produce either well-trained Reserve units or individuals.

(b) Peacetime training of 2 weeks of active duty and extension courses were inadequate to produce qualified Reserve officers.

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Materiel and Facilities

(a) The lack of adequate equipment, both quantitatively and qualitatively, before mobilization was a significant factor in the low combat readiness of National Guard units. However, in the light of personnel and training deficiencies, elimination of the equipment deficiency alone would not have resulted in combat-ready units. The Army Reserve force structure comprised units in name only and had little or no equipment.

(b) The lack of adequate equipment after mobilization degraded training effectiveness.

(c) Mobilization sites were not preselected and maintained in an adequate state of readiness. Training progress was delayed because of the lack of adequate facilities.

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Chapter 3

KOREAN CONFLICT MOBILIZATION OF RESERVE COMPONENTS

ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN PEACETIME

Regular Army¹

In mid 1950 the Active Army was a 10-division force with an authorized strength of 630,000 but an actual strength of 591,497. Due to budgetary limitations, most divisions were understrength, particularly those in the Far East. Only the 82d Airborne Division was at full strength in personnel and equipment. The other divisions were manned at 65 to 75 percent of their authorized strength. The nondivisional units were inadequate to support the divisions in combat. Equipment consisted primarily of World War II types. Much of the service support, both in the US and abroad, was provided by civilians. Mobilization stocks consisted of World War II items and were designed to support a war in Europe. These stocks were below planned levels, unbalanced, and in a poor state of maintenance. Logistical installations required by the Army had been severely curtailed.²

Reserve Components

Roles and Missions. Between 1945 and 1950 several controversial plans were considered for reorganization of the Army Reserve and the National Guard. By 1950, however, much the same overall structure and missions that had existed before World War II were in effect.

Policies and Programs. The Selective Service Act of 1948 governed entry into the Reserve components. The Act provided that men from 19 to 26 years of age who either volunteered for the Active Army or were inducted for 21 months should serve thereafter in a Reserve component for 5 years but without any obligations with respect to active duty for training or attendance at drills. This 5-year obligation could be

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reduced to 3 years by enlisting for that period in a unit of either the National Guard or Army Reserve. The 5-year obligation could be eliminated completely by extending active service for 1 additional year. Other options were offered for young enlistees. For example, a specified number of 18 year olds could enlist for only 1 year of active service and a 6-year Reserve obligation. Men below $18\frac{1}{2}$ years of age could enlist in the National Guard from civilian life with a draft deferral until age 28 if training participation was satisfactory. This provision spurred voluntary enlistments in the National Guard, which had been experiencing difficulties in recruitment since the end of World War II. Additional legislation strengthened the Army Reserve by authorizing pay for inactive duty training and increased the attractiveness of both Reserve components by enabling Reservists to qualify for retired pay.³

Force Structure. The National Guard force structure included 27 divisions and nondivisional units at a higher proportion than was provided in the pre-World War II structure. The Army Reserve force structure included 25 divisions, which, however, existed largely on paper.⁴

Mobilization Plans. Mobilization plans in 1950 were based on war comparable to World War II. There were no plans for limited war and partial mobilization.⁵ Regulations setting forth the sequence to be followed on mobilization were inadequate for a partial and gradual mobilization.

PREMOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY RESERVE

Force Structure

The Army Reserve consisted of units and manpower pools. The units were known as the Active Reserve and were the only elements of the total Army Reserve authorized paid drills. The two major manpower pools were the Volunteer Reserve and the Inactive Reserve.

Personnel

Table 3-1 shows the assigned strength of the Army Reserve by category on 30 June 1950. The combined assigned strength of the Active Reserve and the Volunteer Reserve was 508,617, about 75 percent of the authorized strength of 674,243. This difference was due to budgetary limitations.

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Table 3-1
ASSIGNED STRENGTHS, US ARMY RESERVE
ON 30 JUNE 1950⁶

Category	Officers	Enlisted men	Total
Active Reserve units	69,789	114,226	184,015
Volunteer Reserve	147,646	176,956	324,602
Inactive Reserve	71,933	19,867	91,800
Total	289,368	311,049	600,417

Training

The Active Reserve units were authorized varying numbers of paid drills per year in addition to 15 days of annual active duty for training. Some units were authorized as few as 12 drills per year. Training of these units was hampered by lack of funds, equipment, and facilities. Training of the Volunteer Reserve consisted solely of correspondence courses and, within budget limitations, 15 days of active duty for training annually. The Inactive Reserve had no training obligations. The principal strength of all elements of the Army Reserve was the wartime training and experience of most of its members.

PREMOBILIZATION SITUATION-- ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Force Structure

The National Guard consisted of 27 divisions, 20 regimental combat teams, and some supporting units. The principal nondivisional combat and combat support units were armored cavalry regiments, field artillery battalions, and antiaircraft battalions. The number of nondivisional units was inadequate to support all the divisions.

Personnel

On 30 June 1950 the total assigned strength of the National Guard was 324,761, about 93 percent of the authorized strength of 350,000 men. This shortage was due to budgetary ceilings that had been imposed during FY 50. Only about 72 percent of the officer positions were filled, with severe shortages in Medical, Dental, and Chaplain Corps officers. Only about 25 percent of the warrant officer positions were filled.⁷

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Training

Peacetime training, which consisted of 48 paid drills (2 hours each) and 15 days of annual active duty for training, was severely handicapped by inadequate armory facilities and lack of equipment. Overall, the National Guard had only about 46 percent of its TOE equipment. Owing to budgetary limitations, all resident school training was discontinued on 26 April 1950, and the firing of weapons on weekends was halted as of 1 May 1950.⁸

MOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY RESERVE

General

Partial mobilization of elements of the Army Reserve started almost immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. Because of the lack of plans, the mobilization process was improvised. On 30 June 1950 the Congress authorized the ordering into active service of Volunteer and Inactive Reserve personnel, most of whom were World War II veterans, for use as replacements and fillers for the Active Army. There were five recalls of officers and three recalls of enlisted personnel.⁹

The major units of the Active Reserve were not called because they were considered as part of a final reserve in the event of contingencies in other areas--particularly Europe. However, individuals were called from these units. Between August 1950 and September 1951, 971 miscellaneous units of the Active Reserve, totaling 5372 officers and 28,853 enlisted men, were ordered to active duty to round out Active Army divisions.

Personnel

In the several recalls during the same period, 168,470 individuals (43,106 officers and 125,364 enlisted men) were obtained from the Volunteer and Inactive Reserves. Personnel records of Reservists were not always complete or current. In some cases Inactive Reserve members were recalled before members of the Volunteer Reserve. Many men were called without sufficient warning to put their personal affairs in order. Many were recalled based on World War II military skills for which a requirement no longer existed. Other Reservists were recalled based on MOS requirements that could have been satisfied with available men and minor on-the-job training.¹⁰

Training

The preponderance of individual Reservists ordered to active duty were World War II veterans who were capable of being employed as fillers

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and replacements immediately following brief refresher training. The mobilized Army Reserve units were completely unready for deployment because of deficient unit training.

Facilities

As the Army expanded rapidly during the early stages of mobilization, training installations were activated on a piecemeal basis. Many of the Army Reserve units that were mobilized early were ordered to installations that did not have adequate training facilities and were relocated to other installations.

Materiel

Mobilization had an immediate and adverse impact on the training and unit readiness of Army Reserve units that were not mobilized. Equipment and supplies were withdrawn from Reserve units for use by the Active Army. Materiel on order for Reserve units was diverted to the Active Army.

MOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

General¹¹

The first National Guard units to be mobilized were alerted in the latter part of July and called to Federal service in August 1950. These were nondivisional units consisting primarily of antiaircraft artillery, field artillery, and engineer combat battalions and a number of transportation truck companies. The 40th, 45th, 28th, and 43d Infantry Divisions, with supporting units, were mobilized in September 1950. The 31st and 47th Infantry Divisions were mobilized in January 1951. The 37th and 44th Infantry Divisions were mobilized in January and February 1952, respectively. Between 30 June 1950 and 30 June 1952 a total of 120,000 men were mobilized either as individuals or in 1601 units, including three separate regimental combat teams as well as the eight infantry divisions.

Personnel

Table 3-2 shows the initial strengths of the mobilized National Guard divisions. The relative proportions of strengths to TOE strengths shown for the divisions were generally the same for the nondivisional units that were mobilized. All divisions had critical personnel shortages. During the 4-week alert period at home locations, the divisions were to have discharged ineligible, intensified recruiting, prepared for induction, and increased their drills to 3 per week.¹² Apparently, according to the data

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in Table 3-2, the preinduction recruitment and discharge procedures were not generally effective.

Table 3-2¹³
STRENGTH OF NG DIVISIONS INDUCTED INTO ACTIVE
MILITARY SERVICE

Division	TOE strength	Alerted strength	Number lost between alert and induction	Induction strength ^a	Net strength as percent of	
					TOE	Alerted strength
28th	18,800	9,970	1365	9,582	52	97
40th	18,800	9,601	1956	9,426	50	98
43d	18,800	8,358	1259	7,707	41	92
45th	18,800	8,188	2248	8,260	44	101
31st	18,800	10,135	1992	10,379	55	102
47th	18,800	7,354	1308	8,765	47	119
37th	18,800	7,093	1583	6,355	34	90
44th	18,800	7,825	1633	7,010	37	90

^aIncludes gains after alert.

Training

Although no data are available on the training status of National Guard units at time of mobilization, all units had large numbers of inexperienced men who had enlisted in the National Guard under the provisions of the Selective Service Act of 1948. The percentage of enlisted men in the National Guard divisions with the equivalent of basic training on mobilization varied from 27 to 46 percent. Nondivisional units were generally in the same status. The Master Training Cycle (see Fig. 3-1) prescribed that the first mobilized divisions and separate regimental combat teams conduct a precycle training period of 4 to 6 weeks for cadre training, reception of fillers, and readjustment of personnel. Table 3-3¹⁴ shows the available data on the time required for the divisions to mobilize at the home station and to complete the precycle training.

Precycle training included training of specialists both in unit troop schools and in courses at replacement training centers. The latter training was for common specialists such as motor mechanics, clerk-typists, company




Fig. 3-1—Training Cycle for Inducted National Guard Units

Source: Combined Arms Training Division, G-3 Section, OCAFF, 14 August 1950

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Table 3-3¹⁴

SCHEDULE FOR INDUCTION AND PRECYCLE
TRAINING—NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS

Division (1)	Alert date (2)	Induction date (3)	End precycle training (4)	Elapsed time, col 3—col 4, weeks (5)
28th	1 Aug 50	5 Sep 50	5 Nov 50	9
40th	1 Aug 50	1 Sep 50	5 Nov 50	9½
45th	1 Aug 50	1 Sep 50	5 Nov 50	9½
43d	2 Aug 50	5 Sep 50	5 Nov 50	9
31st	16 Dec 50	16 Jan 51	4 Mar 51	7
47th	16 Dec 50	16 Jan 51	4 Mar 51	7
37th	13 Sep 51	15 Jan 52	28 Jan 52	2
44th	13 Sep 51	15 Feb 52	25 Feb 52	2

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clerks, and supply clerks. Active Army training teams were used to instruct key officers and noncommissioned officers and to assist them in training instruction teams of their own.¹⁵ Apparently the National Guard divisions lacked adequate numbers of personnel with the equivalent of advanced individual training.

Facilities

Facilities were initially inadequate to receive and train the mobilized units. In many cases units reported to installations that were not equipped for training that particular type of unit. This required relocation to other installations and resulted in increased expense and loss in training time.

Materiel

The amount of equipment available for training purposes was severely limited because of critical Army-wide shortages. Only units that were alerted for early oversea deployment were authorized 100 percent of allowances. TOE weapons were available for training purposes but within rigidly scaled allowances. The situation was somewhat better for the first four divisions mobilized because they had about 35 percent of their authorized major items and 100 percent of other authorized items.¹⁶

POSTMOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY RESERVE

General

Members of the Army Reserve called to active duty were used for the most part as replacements or fillers. The Army Reserve units mobilized were so deficient in unit training and so short of personnel that they provided only the skeletal framework for the virtual activation of new units. The postmobilization status of these units will not be discussed further.

Personnel

The early recall programs disclosed glaring deficiencies in the records of members of the Army Reserve, causing many Reservists to be discharged shortly after induction. This resulted in a comprehensive program to complete and update the records. On completion of this program it was determined that a number of Reservists on the rolls but not on active duty were ineligible for recall. Ten percent of all Army Reservists were found to be physically unfit for military service, and about 10 percent more were ineligible for other reasons.¹⁷

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By the end of May 1951, 201,298 members of the Army Reserve were on active duty. Owing to the inequities of the mobilization, all enlisted Reservists involuntarily recalled from the Volunteer or Inactive Reserve were released by December 1951. All officers involuntarily recalled were released after 17 months of service.¹⁸

Training

In spite of the loss of personnel, facilities, and materiel as a result of the partial mobilization, inactive duty training continued for the Army Reserve units. In the summer of 1951, all Army Reserve units that had not been mobilized, comprising 158,101 officers and enlisted personnel, were required to undergo 15 days of annual training. In addition, 15,000 officers of the Volunteer Reserve were called for 15 days of annual training.¹⁹

Facilities

Preparations for annual active duty for training were handicapped by the lack of facilities, which had been taken over by the Active Army for the mobilized units. However, during FY51 and early FY52, 54 armories and 22 motor vehicle sheds were purchased or constructed for use by the Army Reserve.²⁰

Materiel

Lack of equipment severely reduced the effectiveness of the annual active duty for training in FY51 and FY52.

POSTMOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

General

On mobilization the National Guard units were far from ready for deployment. The principal causes of the lack of readiness have been identified in the discussion of personnel, training, facilities, and materiel during the mobilization situation. For purposes of analysis, this discussion covers the postmobilization situation of the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions only. These two divisions were the only National Guard divisions to be employed in combat, and their training was not interrupted by significant personnel levies. The 28th and 43d Infantry Divisions, after sustaining heavy personnel losses due to levies, were eventually deployed to Europe where they were required to continue extensive training to achieve readiness. The other four divisions were used exclusively as training

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divisions and as sources for levies for replacements and cadres for other units. Consequently, the experiences of the divisions other than the 40th and 45th are of no value in this study and will not be discussed further. Nondivisional National Guard units will not be discussed because their training experience generally paralleled that of the six divisions that were not employed in combat.

Personnel

The 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions had net strengths after mobilization of 50 percent and 44 percent, respectively, of their TOE strength. Both divisions required 2 months to receive and absorb fillers and prepare for the start of the prescribed training cycle (see Table 3-3).

Training

The prescribed training cycle when the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions were mobilized is shown in Fig. 3-1. The individual training phase for the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions, as well as the other divisions mobilized early, was compressed to 11 weeks from 14 weeks because it was believed that premobilization training and part of the training time allocated for fillers in the precycle phase would permit such a compression without loss in training proficiency. Both divisions required approximately 8 weeks rather than the prescribed 4 to 6 weeks for precycle filler and cadre training.

Both divisions started the 28-week training cycle in November 1950 and after 17 weeks of training were deployed to Japan (27-31 March 1951) for further training. In Japan the 40th Infantry Division resumed training on 26 April 1951 and the 45th Infantry Division on 14 May 1951. Both divisions were reported to have completed the training cycle on 31 August 1951--52 weeks after mobilization. In summary the 40th Infantry Division required 35 weeks and the 45th Infantry Division 32 weeks of training to complete the prescribed 28-week training cycle.

No information is available about postcycle training. Both divisions were deployed to Korea and entered combat, the 40th Infantry Division in December 1951 and the 45th Infantry Division in January 1952. The time from mobilization to entry into combat was 15 months for the 40th Infantry Division and 16 months for the 45th Infantry Division.

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Facilities and Materiel

Lack of adequate training facilities (especially for range firing) and critical shortages of equipment continued to have some adverse effect on training prior to deployment.

CONCLUSIONS

The Korean mobilization was unique among the recent mobilizations in several respects. Unlike World War II, the commitment of US forces in Korea was followed almost immediately by mobilization that was only partial and creeping in nature. However, as in World War II, a number of causes precluded the production of combat-ready Reserve component units significantly faster than the time prescribed for organization of new units with an Active Army cadre and fillers. As in World War II, the Reserve components made major contributions in providing a ready source of replacement personnel, in augmenting the training base, and in the eventual production of combat-ready units. The major reasons for inability to produce combat-ready units rapidly are discussed below. Many of the reasons were present in the World War II mobilization.

Personnel

The most significant single factor that inhibited the rapid production of combat-ready Reserve component units was the failure in peacetime to man these units at effective TOE strength. Immediately following mobilization the strength of the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions, like that of most Reserve component units, was 50 percent or less of TOE strength. The lack of TOE strength was compounded by shortages of qualified personnel in critical MOS positions, which resulted in the divisions lacking a full cadre when inducted. This situation resulted in delay in achieving combat readiness because of the time required to train cadre personnel and to receive and absorb untrained fillers who were assigned directly from reception stations. Both divisions, like most Reserve component units, lost a significant amount of their assigned premobilization strength because men who were eligible for discharge on mobilization had been carried on the rolls in peacetime.

Training

Both the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions, like most other Reserve component units, had significant numbers of men who lacked basic

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Individual training and training in critical MOSs. This situation was apparently the result of the operation of the Selective Service Act of 1948, which motivated young men to enlist from civilian life in the National Guard as a means of obtaining draft deferral without any special active duty requirement for basic and advanced individual training. As a result, unit proficiency was low and a lengthy precycle training period was required not only to train individuals in critical MOSs but also to train trainers and a considerable number of untrained fillers. Basic and advanced individual training required 8 to 14 weeks. The complete unit training cycle had to be given after mobilization. There was no saving in unit training time as a consequence of premobilization training.

Facilities and Materiel

As in World War II, Reserve component units on mobilization were handicapped in achieving combat readiness by lack of adequate facilities and equipment.

Mobilization Plans

The Korean mobilization was an improvised process. The existing mobilization plans could not be implemented owing to insufficiency of resources. This situation was very apparent because of the difficulties encountered in the partial and creeping mobilization. Even though the mobilization was designed to accommodate a limited war, the available facilities and equipment were inadequate to support both the requirements of operations and the rapid production of combat-ready units.

The decision not to employ all Reserve component units, because of the possible need to meet contingencies in areas other than Korea, resulted in the unplanned utilization of the Volunteer and Inactive Reserves. The poorly planned use of these pools of veterans caused many hardships and laid the basis for the policy subsequently announced by the Congress that the Reserve component units would be called up in national emergencies prior to any levies on Reserve manpower pools.

As during World War II, mobilization planning was deficient in anticipating the total requirements for overseas replacements and fillers for newly activated units. Consequently, units in training were levied extensively for personnel for both purposes. This was a significant factor

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in the delay of the mobilized Reserve component units in achieving combat readiness. Apparently, after the initial deployments to Korea, there was a greater need for individual replacements than for additional units. However, if the mobilized units had not been levied for replacement personnel, there probably would have been a greater demand for personnel from the Volunteer and Inactive Reserves.

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Chapter 4

BERLIN CRISIS MOBILIZATION OF RESERVE COMPONENTS (1961)

ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN PEACETIME

Regular Army

After the end of hostilities in Korea, the Active Army was progressively reduced in strength from 1.5 million in 1953 to an authorized strength of 875,000 and an actual strength of 858,622 in mid-1961, which provided for a 14-division force. Of the 14 divisions, only 11 were considered to be combat effective; the other 3 were heavily involved in training replacements.¹ The divisions had been restructured into a five battle-group (pentomic) organization. Throughout the Active Army, there were significant shortages in personnel and equipment. Equipment was largely of Korean War vintage, and there was a serious backlog of deferred maintenance in both equipment and installations.²

Reserve Components

Roles and Missions. Both the National Guard and the Army Reserve were assigned missions of furnishing units to expand the Active Army, supporting other services (Air Force), expanding the mobilization base, and providing individual reinforcements. The National Guard had an additional mission of manning air defense units (NIKE) in peacetime.

Policies and Programs.^{3,4} The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 established the Ready, Standby, and Retired categories as descending levels of liability for recall to active duty. The Ready Reserve [units and the Ready Reserve Manpower Reinforcement Pool (RRMRP)] could be ordered to active duty on declaration of an emergency by the President in numbers authorized by the Congress. The Standby and Retired Reserve manpower pools could be ordered to active duty only in the event of a declaration of war or emergency by the Congress. The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 permitted calling to active duty up to 1 million of the Ready Reserve from all services

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under an emergency declared by the President. The Act authorized direct enlistment into a Reserve component for 6 years, provided at least 2 of the 6 were spent on active duty. Such enlistees, as well as draftees who served on active duty for at least 2 years, were required to participate in Reserve training until the combined total of active service and Reserve participation totaled 6 years. The sixth year could be spent in the Standby Reserve. The Act also authorized men below $18\frac{1}{2}$ years of age to enlist in a Reserve component with an initial active duty training requirement of 3 to 6 months, followed by participation in Ready Reserve unit training for 3 years and a total Reserve obligation of 8 years. The Act further authorized normal minimum annual inactive duty training of 48 drills and 17 days of annual active duty for training.

Force Structure. Both the National Guard and the Army Reserve provided for combat divisions and supporting units. The Army Reserve also contained training divisions and maneuver commands for use in postmobilization training of units and individuals and the three manpower pools previously described (RRMRP, Standby, and Retired).⁵

Mobilization Plans. The organized units of the National Guard and Army Reserve were divided into three priority groups according to mobilization and deployment schedules and for establishing manning levels and equipment allocations. Detailed tables provided for phased allocations of personnel and equipment to the various units in accordance with their relative priorities.⁶

PREMOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY RESERVE

Force Structure

The Army Reserve units on a paid drill status included 10 infantry divisions, 13 training divisions, 2 maneuver area commands, 1 infantry battle group, 2 engineer amphibious support brigades, 63 miscellaneous combat type battalions, 53 noncombat-type battalions, and 138 major headquarters.⁷

Personnel

On 30 June 1961 the actual strength of the Army Reserve was 1,893,747 (258,273 officers and 1,635,474 enlisted men). Of this total, 1,028,168 were in the Ready Reserve, but only 301,796 were in paid drill status in units.⁸

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Training

Inactive duty training for Army Reserve units consisted of 48 paid drills (2 hours), a minimum of 6 multiple drills (weekend training assemblies), and 15 days of active duty for training annually. During FY61, about 82 percent of those authorized participated in paid drill training and 290,000 (96 percent of those authorized) attended annual active duty for training. The training level varied widely. Few units were beyond the very early phases of basic unit training.

Facilities and Materiel

The equipment in the hands of units was generally obsolescent and was only about 80 percent of that authorized for training, with significant shortages of equipment essential for training. Facilities for inactive duty training were generally inadequate.

PREMOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Force Structure

The National Guard force structure included 27 combat divisions, 11 separate infantry battle groups, 8 armored cavalry regiments, 11 medium tank battalions, 91 missile and air defense artillery battalions, 57 field artillery battalions, and several hundred additional small units.⁹

Personnel

On 30 June 1961 the actual strength of the National Guard was 400,455 (38,298 officers and 362,157 enlisted men), approximately 100 percent of its authorized strength. Of this number 393,807 were in a paid drill status.

Training

The training situation of the National Guard paralleled that of the Army Reserve, except that the on-site air defense missile batteries were considered capable of immediate engagement of hostile targets. During FY61 more than 91 percent of the assigned strength participated in paid drill training and 332,000 (almost 85 percent of assigned strength) attended annual active duty training.

Facilities and Materiel

Like the Army Reserve, the National Guard had critical shortages of equipment, which adversely affected training. Facilities were inadequate for inactive duty training and for maintenance of equipment.

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MOBILIZATION SITUATION - GENERAL

As a result of the international crisis in mid-1961 over the status of Berlin, a partial mobilization of the Reserve components was ordered as well as an increase in the strength of the Regular Army. On 1 August 1961 the Congress authorized the President to recall up to 250,000 Ready Reservists for no more than 12 months. The objectives were (a) to round out the Army forces in Europe, (b) have a six-division force available for deployment to Europe at any time after 1 January 1962, and (c) expand the mobilization and training base in the US.¹⁰

Because of political considerations, mobilization plans were not followed. New plans were made and modified to meet changing Presidential directives. In the end the priorities system was not closely followed, resulting in great variation in the strength and equipment of the various units mobilized. There was insufficient time for proper coordination between Headquarters, Department of the Army, and major subordinate commands; some decisions were made on the basis of inaccurate and incomplete information concerning the status of personnel and equipment in the units recalled.¹¹

MOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY RESERVE

General

Army Reserve units were recalled in two main groups. The first group, the 100th Training Division and other units, was alerted on 25 August to report during the period 25 September - 1 October to activate Fort Polk and operate an Army Training Center. During the alert period a change in stationing plans called for the units to activate Fort Chaffee and operate the training center at that location. The second group of Reserve units was alerted on 28 August to report to home stations on 1 October and to arrive at mobilization stations no later than 15 October. In all, 444 Army Reserve company-sized units were recalled to round out the expanding Active Army forces.¹²

In addition to the recalled units, individual Reservists were called to bring the mobilized National Guard and Army Reserve units up to TOE strength. Many individual Army Reservists were alerted to fill personnel vacancies in certain of the units not mobilized but subject to call-up.¹³

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Personnel

The mobilized units (actual total strength 30,056) were at about two-thirds of TOE strength. The units were brought to TOE strength by assigning 15,234 individual Reservists.

To meet all the needs for trained fillers it was necessary to call individual Reservists who had served 2 or more years of active duty, because men with only 6 months of active duty for training did not have the specialized training to permit the recalled units to attain combat readiness rapidly.

Personnel records of many Reservists were incomplete and not current. In addition, the Army was in the midst of a changeover from manual to machine-processed Reserve personnel records. This resulted in numerous errors in the call-up of individual Reservists. Many personnel recalled were not branch or MOS qualified and were either reassigned to other units or sent to school for additional training. The notification process was poorly handled. Receipt of initial notification of alert of units through press media adversely affected morale and resulted in many requests for official verification. Many Reservists resented the brief period given them to put their personal affairs in order.¹⁴

Training

Most Army Reserve units were in the basic unit training phase at the time of mobilization. Training was severely handicapped by a lack of equipment essential for training and the start of unit training was delayed to absorb fillers and to undergo some cadre training.

Facilities and Materiel

Some units were sent to installations lacking suitable training facilities. The newly activated Army Training Center at Fort Chaffee required major rehabilitation of barracks and training facilities. However, this did not delay the training schedule.

Most units reported to active duty without full equipment authorized by TOE, owing to the reduced allowances authorized for home station training and Army-wide shortages of equipment.

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MOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

General

The National Guard was mobilized in two increments. The first increment, reporting on 1 October, consisted of aggregations of 87 company-sized units (assigned strength of 10,572). These units were selected to round out the Active Army or to replace Active Army units deployed or scheduled for deployment to Europe. The second increment, called up on 15 October, consisted of aggregations of 359 company-size units (assigned strength of 33,700) and constituted the bulk of the division and nondivisional units required to augment the Active Army forces. The units included the 32d Infantry Division, the 49th Armored Division, and the 150th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). The two divisions were alerted on 19 September. In addition, 33,000 Army National Guard personnel, including the 25th and 28th Infantry Divisions, were ordered to participate in an accelerated training program at home stations to increase their combat readiness in the event of further mobilization.¹⁵

Personnel

Table 4-1 shows the personnel status of the mobilized National Guard divisions and the armored cavalry regiment.¹⁶ The proportion of assigned and inducted strengths to TOE strengths shown for the units was generally the same for all the mobilized nondivisional units. To bring the mobilized National Guard units up to TOE strength required recalling 23,593 individual Army Reservists. As in the case of the Army Reserve, the poorly handled notification process had an adverse impact on the morale of mobilized National Guard units.

Training

Personnel shortages, both in total numbers and in critical specialists, and shortages of equipment prevented the immediate start of unit training. The US Continental Army Command (USCONARC) prescribed a special Intensive Combat Training Program (ICTP) for the divisions. This ad hoc program of 13 weeks included five phases:

Phase I - Shakedown, receipt of fillers, and cadre training: 3 weeks.

Phase II - Squad, section, and crew training: 2 weeks.

Phase III - Small-unit and team training: 2 weeks.

Phase IV - Platoon and company training: 3 weeks.

Phase V - Battalion, battle group, and division field exercises:

3 weeks.¹⁷

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Table 4-1¹⁶

PERSONNEL STATUS OF SELECTED MOBILIZED NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

Unit	Authorized TOE strength	Induction strength				Total inducted strength	Inducted strength, % of TOE	Net trained strength, % of TOE
		No prior active duty	Active duty only for training 6 months	Active duty 6 months to 2 years	Active duty more than 2 years			
32d Inf Div	13,748	3594	4734	321	842	9,491	69	43
49th Armd Div	14,617	3259	2948	1833	1004	9,044	62	40
150th ACR	2,799	504	782	181	374	1,841	66	48
Total	31,164	7357	8464	2335	2220	20,376	65	42

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This training program of 13 weeks represented a severe compression of the normal training program, which provided for 27 weeks of training for an infantry division with fillers who had completed individual training. The curtailed program was the minimum deemed necessary to prepare these divisions for possible deployment to Europe by 1 February 1962.¹⁸ Since the USCONARC published schedule of mobilization production times for infantry divisions with trained fillers remained unchanged at 27 weeks, the divisions would continue training if not deployed to Europe.

Facilities and Materiel

Most of the nondivisional units were mobilized at established Active Army installations and there were no serious obstacles to training. Housing and messing facilities initially caused some minor morale problems for the 32d Infantry Division at Ft Lewis and the 49th Armored Division at Ft Polk but training facilities were adequate.

The divisions and most nondivisional units reported to mobilization stations with substantially less than 50 percent of their authorized equipment. A few nondivisional units reported to mobilization stations without the TOE equipment essential to training.¹⁹

POSTMOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY RESERVE

Personnel

The most significant personnel problems were the lack of unit TOE strength and the shortages of critical specialists. Fillers were obtained from the RMRP. The resulting personnel turbulence contributed to the delays in the start of unit training.

Training

All the Army Reserve combat, combat support, and combat service support units completed full unit training programs after mobilization. A few units, after a year on active duty, failed to complete unit training programs successfully before demobilization.²⁰ Some units required more time than specified to successfully complete the appropriate training program. No time was saved in unit training because of prior inactive duty training. An outstanding exception to the training readiness of Army Reserve units was the 100th Training Division, which received the first increment of trainees 3 weeks after arrival at its mobilization station and trained more than 30,000 men during its active service.²¹

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Facilities and Materiel

Training facilities were adequate for the mobilized units after rectification of some initial errors in stationing of units. Shortages of major items of equipment hindered the training of many units. Equipment was withdrawn from nonmobilized units to support the Active Army.²²

POSTMOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

General

This discussion covers only the two National Guard divisions that were mobilized. Their postmobilization situation and activities are typical of all the mobilized National Guard Units.

Personnel

The 32d Infantry Division and 49th Armored Division had net strengths after mobilization of 69 percent and 62 percent, respectively, of their TOE strength. In the 32d Infantry Division, approximately 3850 Reserve fillers were assigned to the division, but 450 of these were later relieved from active duty as a result of erroneous call-up. The 49th Armored Division required about 5500 personnel to achieve TOE strengths after mobilization. The first group of fillers (about 3300) arrived between 25 and 30 October 1961. The second group (about 800) arrived between 10 and 15 November. The remainder (about 500) arrived after 1 December. The difference between the scheduled input of 5500 and actual input of 4600 was due primarily to revocation of orders to active duty.²³

Training

The two National Guard divisions began the ICTP during the period 23-31 October 1961, with the completion date initially established as 1 February 1962 but subsequently revised to 15 February. The 2 divisions completed the 13-week ICTP on schedule, about 17 weeks after mobilization. However, full division-level exercises were not held until May 1962.

Facilities and Materiel

Facilities were generally adequate for training purposes. A major problem was lack of adequate equipment. In spite of numerous actions taken at all higher levels of command, the overall equipment posture of the 2 divisions since mobilization had improved to only about 60 percent by 15 January 1962, the initial target date for equipment readiness. The rounding out of Army forces in Europe, the prepositioning of equipment in

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Europe, and the buildup of other Active Army forces drained Army assets to a point that the two National Guard divisions and supporting units could not be fully equipped.²⁴

CONCLUSIONS

The mobilization that resulted from the Berlin crisis was unlike the mobilizations of World War II and the Korean conflict. The major differences were the absence of hostilities, nondeployment of major Reserve component units, and the smaller scale of mobilization. Because this partial mobilization was designed primarily to deter rather than to fight a war, training programs were severely curtailed and industrial mobilization was limited by previous budgetary constraints. Despite the small number of units mobilized, the Reserve system that existed in 1961 did not produce units ready to start unit training immediately after mobilization. The principal contributing factors are discussed below.

Personnel

As in the previous mobilizations, National Guard and Army Reserve units were not maintained in peacetime at or near TOE strength; some personnel who were being carried were released at mobilization; and there were shortages in critical specialists. Consequently, on mobilization, unit training could not begin until fillers could be provided and absorbed.

The operation of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 resulted in about 67 percent of the personnel of the mobilized units being qualified in individual training on mobilization. By contrast not more than about 46 percent of the personnel of the units mobilized in the Korean conflict were considered qualified in individual training. Limits on the Active Army training base for budgetary reasons was the primary cause for the shortfall in 1961.

Training

The readiness of the divisions for combat operations at the end of the ICTP (17 weeks after mobilization) is undetermined. The divisions successfully participated in extensive division-level exercises in May 1960, about 3 months after completion of the ICTP, and were considered deployment-ready at that time. As in the World War II and the Korean mobilizations, training was adversely affected by personnel problems and equipment shortages.

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Facilities and Materiel

The facilities available for the mobilized National Guard and Army Reserve units were generally adequate.

As in the earlier mobilizations, there was a severe shortage of materiel to support the mobilized units. One element that contributed to this shortage was the unforeseen requirement to preposition additional equipment in Europe. However, there were no requirements to replace combat losses. Based on the experience of this small partial mobilization, there was inadequate materiel to support the total force structure.

Mobilization Plans

The Berlin mobilization indicated severe weaknesses in the management of the RMRP. The available data and the scheme for recall were still inadequate at the time of the Berlin crisis. In the case of units, too, despite the Korean experience, there was no plan for partial mobilization.

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Chapter 5

VIETNAM MOBILIZATION OF RESERVE COMPONENTS (1968)

ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT BEFORE 1968

Regular Army

After the Berlin crisis of 1961 the Active Army was reduced by the end of FY63 to a 16-division force with an authorized strength of 975,000. Following the decision to deploy ground combat units to Vietnam in 1965, the Active Army increased by 1 January 1968 to an 18 2/3-division force with an authorized strength of about 1.5 million. The increase was achieved without mobilization of the Reserve components but by increasing Selective Service calls and activating new units. During the period between the Berlin crisis and the buildup in Vietnam, divisions were reorganized from the five battle group (pentomic) to the division-base-plus-three brigade (ROAD) structure. Increased appropriations permitted reequipping units with modern equipment.

Reserve Components

Roles and Missions. There were no changes in the basic roles and missions of the Reserve components following the Berlin crisis.

Policies and Programs.¹ As a result of reorganizations in 1963, 1965, and 1967 the number of Reserve component units, including divisions, was reduced. The authorized paid-drill strength was established at 400,000 for the National Guard and 260,000 for the Army Reserve.

In 1965 the Army created a 150,000-man Selected Reserve Force (SRF I) to fill a gap in the STRAF (US Strategic Army Forces) resulting from deployment of Active Army units to Vietnam. SRF I consisted of selected Reserve component units authorized full TOE strength and 72 paid drills annually in addition to the annual active duty for training.² The Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act of 1967 established the Selected

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Reserve Force (SRF II) on a statutory basis and provided for priority of allocation of resources to its units. As a result of experience with the SRF I, paid drills were reduced to 58 annually.

Legislation in 1963 (REP 63) and in 1967 established a uniform 6-year military obligation. Men (17 to 26 years old) could satisfy their military obligations by enlisting in a Reserve component unit for 6 years and serving on active duty to complete basic and advanced individual training (average 4 to 6 months) and then in a Reserve component unit for the remainder of their 6 years of obligatory service. Draftees, after 2 years of active service, were placed in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) which was a redesignation of the earlier Ready Reserve Manpower Reinforcement Pool (RRMRP). Enlistees, after a combination of 5 years of active and IRR service, could transfer to the Standby Reserve.

Force Structure

As a result of the aforementioned reorganizations, the National Guard consisted primarily of combat units organized into divisions, separate brigades, and supporting nondivisional units. The Army Reserve consisted primarily of combat support and combat service support units, with the largest units being training divisions and separate combat brigades.

Mobilization Plans

As a result of the experience of the limited mobilization in 1961, the Department of the Army (DA) developed a Partial Mobilization Plan (PAM). The decision in 1965 to expand the Army to support operations in Vietnam without mobilization of National Guard and Army Reserve forces resulted in the PAM's not being kept current.³

PREMOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY RESERVE

Force Structure

The Army Reserve consisted of units and the IRR, Standby, and Retired manpower pools. The units included 13 training divisions, 3 separate infantry brigades, 2 maneuver area commands, 1 field army support command, 4 support brigades, 17 combat battalions, and other units for a total of 3482 company/detachment-sized units.⁴

Personnel

On 30 June 1967 the total actual strength of the Army Reserve was 1,217,984 (255,242 officers and 962,742 enlisted men). Of this total

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706,161 were in the Ready Reserve (units plus IRR), of which 261,957 were in paid-drill status in units.⁵ There were no significant changes before the partial mobilization in April 1968. The strength of the SRF II units in the Army Reserve in FY68 was 44,362.

Training

In FY68, training participation in Army Reserve units was high with 92 percent of those authorized participating in paid drills and 96 percent in annual active duty for training. The major unit reorganization, started in FY67 and completed in FY68, adversely affected training. Many individuals and units required retraining in new skills. Training status varied considerably among units, but the SRF II units, with their priority on equipment and authorizations for extra drills, were believed capable of accomplishing company-level training and successfully completing company-level tests.⁶

Facilities and Materiel

The available 1013 training centers were considered generally adequate for inactive duty individual training but not for unit training. During FY68 there was some improvement in the materiel readiness and availability status of equipment. However, there were significant shortages of major items and repair parts because of the Active Army requirements related to Vietnam.

PREMOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Force Structure

The National Guard consisted of 8 combat divisions, 18 separate combat brigades, 2 engineer brigades, 1 support brigade, 233 maneuver battalions, and miscellaneous combat support units for a total of 3034 company/detachment-sized units. The SRF II units comprised the bulk of the combat elements of a three-division force.⁷

Personnel

On 30 June 1967 the total assigned strength of the National Guard was 420,565 (34,789 officers and 385,776 enlisted men), with 418,074 in a paid-drill status.⁵ This strength was reduced to an average of 411,419 during FY68 in view of the authorized strength of 400,000. The SRF II units in the National Guard had a strength of about 89,000.

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Training

In FY68, training participation was high with about 97 percent of those authorized participating in paid drills and 98 percent in annual active duty for training. All units participated in 4-hour training assemblies that were conducted on a multiple-unit training-assembly basis at weekend training sites.⁸ Despite the turbulence caused by reorganizations and the inadequacies of facilities and equipment, SRF II units were considered to have attained the highest level of readiness achieved by National Guard units in peacetime. Although there were variations among the SRF II units, as a whole they were considered to have achieved company-level training and, in a few instances, battalion-level.

Facilities and Materiel

The lack of adequate training sites caused problems in the conduct of weekend training. Of the 2786 armory facilities for paid drills, 996 were considered inadequate. Shortages of major items and repair parts hindered training. However, input of new or reconditioned equipment improved the mobility posture, predominantly in the SRF units.⁹

MOBILIZATION SITUATION - GENERAL

A partial mobilization was announced on 11 April 1968. The announced purposes of the mobilization were to provide additional units for deployment to Vietnam, to reinforce the STRAF, and to reduce personnel turbulence in the CONUS forces. The mobilization order specified that 76 Reserve component units with an authorized strength of about 20,000 would be mobilized on 13 May and then moved to mobilization stations. The IRR would be used to supply filler personnel.

No serious mobilization planning had been done since 1965. Events in Vietnam and Korea in January 1968 made a partial mobilization likely, and plans were revised rapidly. The selection of units was not based on accurate readiness data. The hurried pace of planning and security considerations prevented proper coordination among the headquarters involved.¹⁰

The mobilization order specified that the members of the units called up were ordered to active duty for no more than 24 months or until their unit was released from active duty, unless expiration of their statutory Reserve obligation or enlistment required earlier release. Enlisted men whose statutory obligation or enlistment expired on or before 12 December 1968 were exempted from the mobilization.¹¹

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MOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY RESERVE

General

The 42 Army Reserve units mobilized included 1 infantry battalion, 11 medical units, 9 transportation companies, and a variety of combat service support units.

Personnel

Table 5-1 shows the data on the total strength of all the mobilized Army Reserve units.¹² The loss of enlisted men during the alert period was due primarily to exemptions provided by the mobilization criteria. A large number of officer and enlisted personnel were not branch or MOS qualified because of the reorganizations before mobilization. Shortages were filled by personnel from the IRR and the Active Army. Of the 2752 enlisted Reservists recalled from the IRR, 1692 were assigned to mobilized Army Reserve and National Guard units and 1060 were assigned to Active Army units. Many of these Reservists were late in reporting, and many were unqualified.¹³

Training

Most units closed at their mobilization stations during the period 14-21 May and began unit training programs on 27 May. The low readiness status of the units because of lack of qualified personnel and equipment (stemming, in part, from recent reorganization) resulted in the 8 weeks of unit training, as estimated in premobilization plans, being extended by varying numbers of weeks.¹⁴

Facilities and Materiel

Training facilities were generally adequate except initially at Ft Lewis. Maintenance facilities were adequate except initially at Fts Carson, Lewis, Riley, and Meade. Most units were short in major TOE items of equipment, and much of their equipment was obsolete or nonstandard.¹⁵

MOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

General

The 34 National Guard units mobilized included the 29th Inf Bde; the 69th Inf Bde; the 1st Sq, 18th Armd Cav; and other smaller units.

Personnel

Table 5-2 shows the personnel status of selected major units and the grand total of all National Guard units that were mobilized.¹⁶ Many units

Table 5-1¹²STRENGTH OF ARMY RESERVE UNITS INDUCTED
INTO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE

Category	Off	WO	EM	Total
TOE strength	336	52	5923	6311
Alerted strength	284	68	5600	5952
Number lost during alert period	21	7	796	824
Percent of alerted strength	7.4	10.3	14.2	13.8
Voluntary gains during alert period	5	2	46	53
Net inducted strength	268	63	4850	5181
Percent of alerted strength	94.4	92.6	86.6	87.0
Percent of TOE strength	79.8	121.2	81.9	82.1

Table 5-2¹⁶STRENGTH OF NATIONAL GUARD UNITS INDUCTED
INTO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE

Category	29th Inf Bde ^a	69th Inf Bde ^b	1st Sqdn, 18th Armd Cav	Total ARNG
TOE strength	3710	4582	1002	13,716
Alerted strength	3309	4411	895	12,922
Number lost during alert period	288	271	51	918
Percent of alerted strength	8.7	6.1	5.7	7.1
Voluntary gains during alert period	69	103	11	230
Net inducted strength	3090	4243	855	12,234
Percent of alerted strength	93	96	96	95
Percent of TOE strength	83	93	85	89

^aLess the 100th Bn, 442d Inf, and the 277th MI Det, USAR units assigned to the Bde on mobilization.^bLess the 241st MI Det, a USAR unit assigned to the Bde on mobilization.

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that had been recently reorganized were mobilized with personnel who were not branch or MOS qualified. The required retraining and reassignment of individuals after mobilization delayed the start of unit training.¹⁷ Personnel shortages were filled by personnel from the IRR and the Active Army.

Training

Lack of qualified personnel and equipment were major factors that resulted in extending the time required for unit training beyond premobilization estimates. Personnel who were not MOS qualified had to be trained by on-the-job training (OJT) or in schools. The necessity to conduct individual training concurrently with unit training made it difficult for many units to progress at the required pace. Units had to begin training while still understrength. The 29th Inf Bde in Hawaii delayed unit training because filler personnel from CONUS were late in arriving. Many units suffered because their officers and NCOs were not qualified instructors.¹⁸

Facilities and Materiel

Facilities were generally adequate for training, but there was an initial shortage of maintenance facilities. Shortages of essential items of equipment at mobilization caused delays in the start of effective unit training.

POSTMOBILIZATION SITUATION - GENERAL

Of the 76 units mobilized, 43 units (35, Army Reserve; 8, National Guard) were designated for deployment. The remaining 33 units (7, Army Reserve; 26, National Guard) were used to fill gaps in the STRAF. Most of the deploying units were combat service support units whereas the units assigned to the STRAF were primarily combat and combat support units. Most of the deploying units left for Vietnam in September and October 1968, about 4 to 5 months after mobilization.

POSTMOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY RESERVE

General

Table 5-3 summarizes the progress of selected Army Reserve units. These units include those considered major units by the Department of the Army and other representative units.

Personnel

The major personnel problems were malassignments resulting from recent reorganization, personnel shortages, and lack of MOS qualification.

Table 5-3^a
MOBILIZATION PROGRESS—SELECTED ARMY RESERVE UNITS

Unit	Closed mobilization station	Personnel status			Equipment status		Training					Remarks
		TOE	Percent assigned at alert	Percent mobilized	Percent on hand at alert	REDCON at mobilization	USCONARC unit ATP training (BUT/AUT), weeks	Premobilization estimate, weeks	Postmobilization re-evaluation, weeks	Start of unit training	Time to complete training, weeks	
Deploying units												
1002d S & S Co ^b	17 May	244	100+	100+	87	C-4	8	8	8	27 May	9	Reorganized from a QM Co; most officers replaced, court action delayed deployment
319th Transportation Co (lt trk, 2½ ton)	18 May	133	86	84	43	C-4	7	7	9	27 May	9	Influx of new equipment hampered training
74th Medical Hospital (field)	20 May	184	71	27	12	C-4	13	8	10	27 May	10	Severe initial personnel shortages and lack of qualified personnel; Active Army personnel used as fillers; considerable training support rendered by Active Army
231st Transportation Co (mdm bk)	17 May	183	100+	100+	77	C-4	7	7	7	27 May	7	Major reorganization with different types of floating craft; outstanding Active Army support aided training
173d QM Co (petri) ^b	21 May	175	100+	100+	30	C-4	8	8	10	27 May	12	Reorganized from different type QM Co; extensive individual retraining required; low morale affected training
STRAF units												
100th Bn, 442d Inf	14 May	841	78	61	24	C-4	13	8	13	27 May	15	Initial shortage of personnel and equipment; replacements primarily from IRR who arrived late
203d Transportation Co (lt trk, 2½ ton)	17 May	179	100	60	4	C-4	7	7	8	27 May	8	Major reorganization before and after mobilization; lack of MOS-qualified personnel; Active Army officers and NCOs required to replace mobilized Reserve personnel
890th Transportation Co (mdm trk) ^b	27 May	186	82	79	89	C-4	7	7	10	3 June	10	Initial shortage of MOS-qualified personnel
724th Transportation Co (mdm trk, petri) ^b	27 May	186	100+	97	97	C-1	7	7	10	3 June	10	Reorganization with new equipment; initial lack of MOS-qualified personnel

^aSource: DA DCSOPS Periodic Mobilization Progress Reports, April–October 1968, and data provided by DA OCAR.

^bUnits of the Selected Reserve Forces (SRF).

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The number of individuals who were MOS and branch qualified was much lower than the initial status reports had indicated. Consequently, MOS training was conducted concurrently with unit training with the result that time required to complete unit training had to be extended. Many officers and noncommissioned officers were found to be unqualified as leaders or instructors and had to be replaced. Morale problems were serious in several units because members questioned the need for the mobilization, especially in the STRAF units. After arrival in Vietnam, most of the members of the deployed units were transferred to other units to prevent the loss of all the personnel of a unit at the same time because of the rotation policy. As a result the mobilized units at redeployment and demobilization in 1969 contained very few Reservists.¹⁹

Training

All units completed unit training programs after mobilization but in nearly all cases additional time was required beyond the premobilization estimates. The Active Army provided an unusual amount of training support, including designation of Active Army units to assist in the conduct and supervision of unit training, assignment of training assistance teams and civilian technical representative teams, and large allocations of school quotas.²⁰ Most mobilized units required the full production time specified in CONARC regulations for unit training; in other words, units did not derive maximum benefit from inactive duty training in terms of unit training levels achieved.

Facilities and Materiel

Training facilities were adequate for the mobilized units after initial adjustments. Virtually all units reported outstanding installation support. Initial equipment shortages caused delays in the start of effective unit training. Prompt actions by higher headquarters alleviated most equipment problems and by mid-July all but one unit had reached an equipment REDCON of C-1.²¹

POSTMOBILIZATION SITUATION - ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

General

Table 5-4 summarizes the mobilization progress of the two National Guard brigades and other representative units. Personnel and training problems were comparable to those encountered by mobilized Army Reserve units. For purposes of analysis this discussion covers only the two

Table 5-4^a
 MOBILIZATION PROGRESS—SELECTED ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

Unit	Closed mobilization station	Personnel status			Equipment status		Training				Remarks	
		TOE	Percent assigned at alert	Percent mobilized	Percent on hand at alert	REDCON at mobilization	USCONARC unit ATP training (BUT/AUT), weeks	Premobilization estimate, weeks	Postmobilization re-evaluation, weeks	Start of unit training		Time to complete training, weeks
<u>Deploying units</u>												
1st Sqn, 18th Armd Cav ^b	17 May	1002	89	85	55	C-4	15	8	11	3 June	15	Reorganized with new equipment; considerable training support from Active Army; 25 Sep decision resulted in inactivation of unit
3d Bn, 197th Arty (155-mm how., TD)	20 May	598	94	91	86	C-4	13	8	10	20 May	10	Personnel turbulence; new equipment; civil disturbance training requirement 1967/1968
2d Bn, 138th Arty (155-mm how., SP)	21 May	537	100+	100+	53	C-4	13	8	13	27 May	13	Reorganization; personnel turbulence; new equipment; civil disturbance training requirement 1967/1968
116th Engr Bn (C)	13 May	812	100+	100+	65	C-4	13	8	9	27 May	9	Initial equipment shortage; outstanding Active Army training support
<u>STRAF units</u>												
29th Inf Bde (sep)												Applies to brigade as a whole; reorganization and personnel turbulence
HHCB	13 May	217	89	87	80	C-4	13	8	11	27 May	15	Reorganization
40th Avn Co	27 May	135	80	82	80	C-4	13	8	11	3 June	28	Major reorganization before and after mobilization with different type aircraft; company completed AUT in Oct but because of major equipment modification did not complete Co ATT until Dec
GS Plt, 29th Avn Co ^b	13 May	39	64	67	67	C-4	13	8	10	27 May	15	New organization
Troop E, 19th Cav ^b	23 May	170	91	89	64	C-4	15	8	13	27 May	16	New organization using an inactivated unit of a different type as personnel source
227th Engr Co ^b	13 May	217	90	82	91	C-4	13	8	9	27 May	16	Completed AUT after 12 weeks but failed ATT and required additional training

Table 5-4 (continued)

Unit	Closed mobilization station	Personnel status			Equipment status		Training					Remarks
		TOE	Percent assigned at alert	Percent mobilized	Percent on hand at alert	REDCON at mobilization	USCONARC unit ATP training (BUT/AUT), weeks	Premobilization estimate, weeks	Postmobilization re-evaluation, weeks	Start of unit training	Time to complete training, weeks	
29th Support Bn ^b	13 May	742	89	86	85	C-4	13	8	13	27 May	15	Some reorganization
1st Bn, 487th Arty (105-mm how., TD) ^b	13 May	508	90	86	82	C-4	13	8	14	27 May	16	Some reorganization
1st Bn, 299th Inf ^b	13 May	841	89	79	87	C-4	13	8	13	27 May	13	Some reorganization
2d Bn, 299th Inf ^b	13 May	841	91	82	87	C-4	13	8	13	27 May	12	Some reorganization
69th Inf Bde (sep)												Applies to brigade as a whole; reorganization and civil disturbance training requirement 1967/1968
HHC ^b	23 May	217	100+	100+	46	C-4	13	8	11	27 May	11	Some reorganization
169th Avn Co ^b	23 May	135	87	84	57	C-4	13	8	11	27 May	11	Some reorganization
Troop E, 114th Cav ^b	23 May	170	100+	100+	46	C-4	15	8	11	27 May	11	Reorganization; source of personnel for certain elements from an inactivated ordnance unit
169th Engr Co ^b	23 May	217	95	93	36	C-4	13	7	11	27 May	11	Major reorganization
109th Support Bn ^b	23 May	742	92	91	35	C-4	13	8	11	27 May	13	Major reorganization
2d Bn, 130th Arty (105-mm how., TD) ^b	23 May	508	95	92	44	C-4	13	8	11	27 May	11	Some reorganization
1st Bn, 137th Inf ^b	23 May	841	97	93	33	C-4	13	8	11	27 May	13	Some reorganization
2d Bn, 137th Inf ^b	23 May	841	96	92	47	C-4	13	8	11	27 May	13	Some reorganization
2d Bn, 133d Inf (mech)	23 May	911	97	94	72	C-4	13	8	11	27 May	15	Some reorganization; failed ATT after 13 weeks—required additional training
Nonbrigade units												
1st Bn, 211th Arty (155-mm how., TD)	20 May	554	100+	97	57	C-2	13	8	15	27 May	14	Some reorganization
113th Maint Co (lt) (DS)	20 May	154	83	81	38	C-4	13	8	7	27 May	7	Reorganized from a different unit of similar type

^aSource: DA DCSOPS Periodic Mobilization Progress Reports, April–October 1968, and data provided by DA National Guard Bureau.

^bUnits of the Selected Reserve Force (SRF).

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brigades because their postmobilization situation and activities are considered representative of most mobilized National Guard units.

Personnel

The 29th and 69th Inf Bdes had net strengths after mobilization of 83 and 93 percent, respectively, of their TOE strength. Filler personnel for the 29th Inf Bde first started to arrive about 2 months after mobilization. They arrived in small groups over an extended period of time; hence, the brigade did not reach 100 percent TOE strength until after completion of advanced unit training (AUT). The brigade maintained this strength until early 1969 when it was levied for 1500 personnel to serve as replacements in Vietnam. This resulted in a lowered readiness status that was never rectified completely before demobilization in December 1969.²² The 69th Inf Bde was brought up to strength rapidly with IRR and Active Army fillers because it was replacing a STRAF brigade of the 5th Inf Div (Mech) that was deployed to Vietnam in July 1968.

Training

The two brigades started training on 27 May. The premobilization estimate called for an 8-week training program [BUT (basic unit training)/AUT] for both brigades. A reevaluation of the status of the brigades subsequent to mobilization resulted in a revised estimate to a 13-week program (9-week BUT, 4-week AUT) for the 29th Inf Bde and an 11-week program (7-week BUT, 4-week AUT) for the 69th Inf Bde.

The 29th Inf Bde completed its 9-week BUT on schedule but it required an extra 4 weeks (8 weeks total) to complete AUT, making a grand total of 17 weeks. Brigade-level exercises were not conducted until November and December. Consequently, the brigade did not successfully complete operational readiness tests until the end of 1968 and was rated as combat-ready some 7 months after mobilization.²³

The 69th Inf Bde required 10 weeks to complete BUT rather than the planned 7 weeks. Lack of leadership ability and branch and MOS qualification from squad leader through company commander level were the major contributing factors. An advisory group from the 3d Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) was assigned direct responsibility for training supervision. This was accomplished, in part, by matching commander for commander, down to the platoon leader level, and staff member for staff member. A 3-week AUT program began on 3 August, culminating in a brigade-level exercise.

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Battalion training tests were completed by 24 August, about 15 weeks after mobilization. The brigade was reorganized in early 1969 and integrated into the 5th Inf Div to replace the brigade that had deployed to Vietnam.²⁴

Facilities and Materiel

Training facilities, after initial adjustments, were adequate, and installation support, particularly in the case of the 69th Inf Bde at Ft Carson, was outstanding. As in the case of the Army Reserve units, prompt action by higher headquarters alleviated the equipment shortages that had existed at mobilization, and all units were at REDCON C-1 materiel status by mid-July.²⁵

CONCLUSIONS

The 1968 partial mobilization had unique characteristics as contrasted to the mobilizations of World War II, the Korean Conflict, and the Berlin crisis. In 1968 mobilization occurred about 3 years after the US had committed ground troops to combat operations in Vietnam. The number of units mobilized was so small that the general public and the personnel mobilized questioned the need for the mobilization. The total number of personnel mobilized was about 1.3 percent of the Active Army strength and only 3 percent of the paid-drill strength. The number of units mobilized was very small compared with the total number of National Guard and Army Reserve units. Unlike the earlier mobilizations, the 1968 mobilization, for various reasons, provided liberal exemption criteria that resulted in the loss to the mobilized units of experienced personnel.

The majority of the units mobilized were in the SRF category for a considerable period before mobilization. However, the preliminary estimates of the required postmobilization unit training were found in almost every case to have been overoptimistic. Either the unit readiness of SRF units had not been measured accurately in all cases or the unit training readiness was severely hindered by reorganizations, issue of new types of equipment requiring recycling of training, and the inclusion of civil disturbance training in the National Guard inactive duty training programs. Despite the premobilization estimates of the training readiness achieved by SRF units, those mobilized had to start a full unit training program. There were no apparent differences in the overall training readiness status between the mobilized SRF and non-SRF units at the time of mobilization.

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Because of the small number of units mobilized, the support given by the Active Army was on a greater scale compared with the earlier mobilizations. Deficiencies in equipment were eliminated quickly and well before most of the mobilized units could complete their unit training programs. In almost every case an appropriate Active Army unit was given the assignment to assist the training of a specific National Guard and Army Reserve unit. The progress of each mobilized unit was closely monitored by every Army headquarters concerned, and vigorous action was taken to remedy deficiencies. Nevertheless, the time required for completion of unit training generally exceeded that specified in the US CONARC mobilization production schedule for new units formed from a trained cadre and fillers that had completed individual training. The various circumstances that influenced the completion of unit training are discussed in the following subparagraphs.

Virtually all the National Guard and Army Reserve units deployed to Vietnam gradually lost their character as Reserve units. Most Reservists were transferred from the units because of the infusion policy to forestall all personnel of a unit being eligible to rotate back to the US at about the same time. The necessity for a full unit training program for small Reserve component units to be deployed to a theater with an infusion policy is questionable.

Personnel

Owing to a more realistic National Guard and Army Reserve force structure (smaller number of units), the Reserve component units were maintained at strengths much closer to TOE than had been the case in previous mobilizations. For a variety of reasons, however, the mobilized units had an excessive percentage of officers and enlisted men who were not branch or MOS qualified. Reorganization, geographical recruitment, inadequate inactive duty training, and a liberal policy on exemption of personnel from mobilization contributed to the shortage of branch and MOS qualified personnel. Consequently, more training time and more Active Army support were required than had been anticipated.

Training

As in previous mobilizations, training was adversely affected by personnel problems and initial equipment shortages. However, the equipment problems were solved much more rapidly than in previous mobilizations. The major factors that adversely affected training were the unit

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reorganizations, to include issue of new types of equipment, and consequent imbalance of appropriately trained personnel. Whether the imbalance was due solely to the reorganizations or to faulty premobilization personnel practices or the limitation derived from unit recruiting from a relatively small geographic area is undetermined. It was found that the quality of leadership in many of the mobilized units was below acceptable standards. This contributed, in part, to the fact the units could not be considered to have completed any part of the unit phase of training programs. As a result the Active Army was required to provide extensive support in the form of large quotas for officer and NCO schools, instructor teams and host units, assignment of Active Army personnel after mobilization, and reassignment of nonbranch qualified National Guard and Army Reserve officers. All units were required to undergo complete unit training programs. In most cases these programs were extended significantly before the units could attain training readiness. Most of the 29th Inf Bde was considered to have attained complete operational readiness within 4 months after mobilization; however, the 40th Aviation Company did not attain this status until the end of 1968, some 7 months after mobilization. The 69th Inf Bde completed battalion training tests 15 weeks after mobilization, but its readiness for combat operations was undetermined.

Facilities and Materiel

Budget constraints and major force reorganizations curtailed construction of Reserve component facilities during the 1965-1968 period. Lack of adequate facilities at field training sites and training areas at home stations may have contributed to the low status of unit training readiness at time of mobilization. However, the SRF units were considered to have achieved unit training readiness at the company level and in some cases even at the battalion level. The facilities available for the mobilized units were adequate.

Equipment shortages were relatively quickly eliminated after mobilization. One factor that hindered eliminating the shortage was the lack of familiarity by the Reserve component units with Active Army supply and maintenance procedures, which had been revised considerably during the 1960's.

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Mobilization Plans

Despite the detailed plans for a partial mobilization, which resulted from the experience of the Berlin crisis, the selection of units to be mobilized was difficult because of a lack of current readiness data. Short suspense dates and security restrictions precluded proper coordination at all planning levels and resulted in some erroneous designation of units and certain changes in mobilization stations.

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